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NOTES
INDIAN LAND CLAIMS: SHERRILL AND THE IMPENDING
LEGACY OF THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES
Patrick W Wandres"
Introduction
Indian land disputes have been the source of legal controversy since the
founding of the United States. In 1970, lands purchased, confiscated, or
otherwise acquired by the United States from Indian tribes had an estimated
value of over $560,000,000,000.' Indian tribes had remote success in the hard-
fought federal litigation of land claims until recently, but their future success
is unlikely. Through its decision in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,2
the Supreme Court essentially accomplished what Justice Powell urged
Congress to do in the majority opinion of County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian
Nation (Oneida 11) ten years prior3: It virtually extinguished redress for Indian
land claims against states by using the doctrine of laches as a defense,
essentially time-barring such claims due to undue or inexcusable delay. As a
decade passed without legislation by Congress in this regard, Justice Stevens'
dissent in Sherrill exposed what can only be called judicial activism involved
in Justice Ginsberg's majority opinion, and how the Court effectively
overlooked and overruled good standing law to reach its decision.4 The
Court's decision in Sherrill will more than likely severely disrupt all Indian
property right remedies in the lower courts, as exemplified by the decision in
Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki'
This note will address a general background of relevant Indian land claims
and their success in the judicial system up to Sherrill, paying special attention
to the Oneida case regarding the use of the doctrine of laches as applied to
Indian land claims. This note will then discuss the likely consequences that
* J.D., 2006, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Russel L. Barsh, Indian Land Claims Policy in the United States, 58 N.D. L. REv. 7,
8 (1982) (citing 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 252 (Series No. 7362-7364,
1975)).
2. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
3. See id. at 221.
4. See generally id. at 222-27 (Justice Stevens' dissent).
5. 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005).
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the Sherrill decision will have on Indian land claims, particularly eastern
Indian claims in the judicial system post-Sherrill. The Second Circuit's
decision in Cayuga is a preliminary example of what is to come regarding
Indian land claims cases and takes the Sherrill decision several steps farther
in applying the doctrine of laches. Denied upon appeal by the Second Circuit,
the Court will likely affirm the Cayuga decision if it chooses to hear the case
on writ of certiorari, and re-affirm the Sherrill decision by clarifying the broad
scope which the Sherrill decision inevitably opened regarding the application
of laches.
Background
To understand why the Court found the doctrine of laches a valid defense
to Indian land claims, the historical background leading up to Indian land
claims must be understood, bearing in mind that no brief historical explanation
could ever encompass the entirety and depth of all Indian land rights litigation
in the United States. Before the Revolutionary War, colonists recognized the
right of the numerous eastern Indian tribes to the possession of their aboriginal
land title, and termination of such title was restricted.6 In 1790, Congress
passed the first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, commonly referred to as the
Non-Intercourse Act (NIA), prohibiting conveyance of Indian lands except by
treaty with the federal government or by congressional action.7 By the early
1800s, federal policy had shifted away from the protection of Indians' right of
possession of aboriginal lands.' In order to make eastern land available for
white settlers, the government removed the Indians to reservation land set
aside in western territories. 9 Congress passed the Indian Removal Act in 1830,
which authorized the exchange of Indian land in the east for land reserved west
of the Mississippi River.' ° By the end of the nineteenth century, federal policy
had shifted toward the assimilation of Indians into the dominant white culture
through land allotments." The surplus land acts allotted set amounts of
acreage to individual Indians, with the land inalienable for twenty-five years,
6. Oneida Indian Nation v. City of Sherrill, 145 F. Supp. 2d 226, 233 (N.D.N.Y. 2001)
(citing County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985) (Oneida II)).
7. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000); Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 231-32.
8. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 205 (2005).
9. See FELIX COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 78 (Rennard Strickland et
al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN].
10. Id. at 81; see also Treaty ofBuffalo Creek, U.S.-NY Indians, Jan. 15, 1838,7 Stat. 550.
11. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463,466 (1984); see also Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388
(1887).
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after which it was believed that the Indians would be assimilated into the
culture of the white settlers who purchased the surrounding surplus land.' 2
Un-allotted lands were opened for homesteading to white settlers who claimed
more than ninety million acres of surplus reservation land, which "resulted in
a checkerboard pattern of Indian and non-Indian ownership of reservation
lands."'
13
By the early 1900s, federal policy had shifted again, as the government
recognized that assimilation was not occurring as expected and preservation
of the Indian culture was actually more acceptable and desirable than
assimilation. 4 Allotment ended in 1934 with the Indian Reorganization Act,"
which "encouraged tribal self-government, made funds available for economic
improvement of the Indians, and made further provisions for protecting Indian
lands."' 6 Resistance to this act surfaced shortly thereafter, aiming at the
termination of tribal sovereignty status. 7 However, in 1958, an era of Indian
self-determination began repudiating this termination policy.,8
Direct litigation of Indian land claims by Indian nations is a somewhat
recent occurrence in the history of the United States. "From the late 1700's
until the middle 1960's the Oneidas attempted, in vain, to obtain redress for
land claims and other grievances."19 Until quite recently, several legal barriers
had kept the majority of Indian claims out of both federal and state courts.
One of these barriers was the inability to access the judicial system at both
federal and state levels. In 1831, the Supreme Court held that "an Indian tribe
or nation within the United States is not a 'foreign state' in the sense of the
Constitution, and cannot maintain an action in the courts of the United
States. 20 Indian tribes thereafter were generally held not to be foreign states,
but rather, domestic dependent nations; 2' thus, tribes could not invoke the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Access was barred to lower federal
courts for many years because Indians were not recognized as citizens of the
12. Oneida Indian Nation v. City of Sherrill, 145 F. Supp. 2d 226, 235 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 235-36 (citing COHEN, supra note 9, at 144).
15. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2000) (originally enacted as Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat.
984).
16. Sherrill, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 235 (citing COHEN, supra note 9, at 147-49).
17. Id. (citing COHEN, supra note 9, at 152-59).
18. Id. (citing COHEN, supra note 9, at 180).
19. Id. (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 719 F.2d 525, 529 (2d Cir.
1983)).
20. Cherokee v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831).
21. Id. at 27.
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United States.22 In 1875, Congress created federal question jurisdiction,23 but
whether Indians could invoke that jurisdiction to sue in federal court remained
unclear.24 Tribal land claims were generally barred by the sovereign immunity
accorded to the states under the Eleventh Amendment.25 Of 135 cases filed by
67 tribes between 1881 and 1945, under special legislation, 103 were
dismissed, primarily on jurisdictional rationalizations.26 Of the remaining
cases in which courts awarded compensation to tribes, offsets and legal fees
generally exceeded the award.27
State court access was also often problematic. Since many Indian land
claims were usually brought against the states themselves, not surprisingly,
state courts did not warmly receive the claims of Indian tribes.2" States passed
laws that often weighted the legal process against Indians by excluding them
from juries or declaring them incompetent as witnesses.29 For the few cases
which actually reached the trial stage, the juries chosen were generally
prejudiced against Indians, which further served as a disincentive to bringing
actions in state courts well into the present century.30
Congress formed the Indian Claims Commission in 1946.3' This
Commission had the authority to hear and to finally determine all claims of
Indian tribes against the federal government that accrued before the
Commission was created in August 13, 1946, a task Congress intended for the
Commission to complete in ten years.32 The Commission's decisions were
appealable to the U.S. Court of Claims, and ultimately to the Supreme Court.33
Despite recognizing equitable claims, the Commission and the Court of Claims
22. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 255 n.l (1985). Native
Americans were finally officially recognized as citizens of the United States on June 2, 1924.
Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
23. Indian Land Claims, 99 HARV. L. REV. 254, 260 (1985).
24. See id. at 260-61.
25. Id. at 261.
26. June Lorenzo, Summary of Land Rights in the United States, http://web.archive.org/
web/2004082820151 1/http://www.firstpeoples.org/land rights/unitedstates/ussummary.htm
(last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
27. Id.
28. Indian Land Claims, supra note 23, at 261.
29. Nell J. Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, andLimitations, 132
U. PA. L. REv. 195, 217 (1984).
30. Id.
31. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049.
32. Lorenzo, supra note 26..
33. Id.
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limited relief to monetary compensation."' It soon became apparent that the
Act failed to meet the expectations of either tribes or of Congress.35 In 1965,
"Congress explicitly dispelled the notion that Indian tribes could not bring
suits in federal court on their own. 3 6 In the early 1970s, President Nixon
declared that the termination policy under the Indian Claims Commission Act
was a failure, and he pronounced a new policy of self-determination. 7 As a
result, the number of land claims rose, with significant victories for the tribes.38
The Supreme Court decided two of the most significant land claim cases in
1974 and 1985: Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida (Oneida ),39 and
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida II).4o The Oneida I
decision established that tribes present federal questions4 within federal
jurisdiction when asserting "possessory rights ... to their aboriginal lands,
particularly when confirmed by treaty. 4 2 The Oneida II decision firmly
established that the clear policy embodied in the Non-Intercourse Act (NIA)
was that no state "should purchase Indian land without the acquiescence of the
Federal Government,' 43 and expressed that those states that violate the rule are
subject to suits for damages.'t This case essentially influenced numerous
tribes to pursue land claims against states, though success never came easily.
In Oneida II, three Indian tribes brought an action against Madison and
Oneida Counties of New York, seeking trespass damages for fair rental value
of land presently owned and occupied by the counties.45 The tribes alleged
that the 1795 agreement which conveyed the land to New York was void
because the federal government did not approve the sale as required under the
NIA.' The district court agreed and granted damages of $16,694 plus
interest.47 Upon appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the decision, and the
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (1975), Pub. L. No. 93-638,
88 Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2000)); Lorenzo, supra note 26.
38. Lorenzo, supra note 26.
39. 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
40. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
41. Id. at 250.
42. Oneida I, 414 U.S. at 667.
43. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 232.
44. See id. at 233 ("Indians' commonlaw right to sue is firmly established.").
45. Id. at 239.
46. See id. at 232.
47. Id. at 230.
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Supreme Court also affirmed the finding of liability.4 The 5-4 majority held
that Indian tribes have a federal common law cause of action to enforce their
aboriginal rights, citing numerous prior decisions for support, and stating "[i]n
keeping with well established principles.., the Oneidas can maintain this
action for violation of their possessory rights based on federal common law.' t 9
The Court rejected the counties' asserted affirmative defenses to the claims,
including that no state or federal statute of limitations barred the suit. 0 The
Court also dismissed the argument that the 1795 conveyance was ratified by
Congress through the approval of two treaties in which the tribe granted
additional land to the state,"' by stating that "plain and unambiguous action"
is needed to deprive Indians of title to their land.52 Finally, the Court found
that the affirmative defense claim, that the Oneidas' suit presented a non-
justiciable political question, to be without merit.5 3 In closing, the Court
urged Congress to enact legislation extinguishing future Indian land claims of
this type, stating, "[o]ne would have thought that claims dating back for more
than a century and a half would have been barred long ago.,,5' The opinion,
however, stopped short of addressing whether the doctrine of laches could bar
these types of claims, because though the counties argued it at trial, this
defense was not preserved on appeal.55 The Court therefore declined to
address it, and only mildly rebutted Justice Stevens' dissent regarding laches.56
In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that the Court should have barred the
Oneidas' claims using the doctrine of laches.57 Justice Stevens stated that the
decision was "an unprecedented departure from the wisdom of the common
law.""8  Justice Stevens noted that while there is no federal statute of
limitations governing Indian tribes' ability to enforce property rights, the
"settled practice has been to adopt the state law of limitations as federal law."'5 9
"Given their burden of explaining nearly two centuries of delay in the
prosecution of this claim, and considering the legitimate reliance interests of
48. Id. at 233.
49. Id. at 236.
50. Id. at 233.
51. Id. at 246.
52. Id. at 248.
53. Id. at 249.
54. Id. at 253.
55. Id. at 245.
56. Id. at 245 n.16.
57. See id. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 256.
59. Id. at 256-57.
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the counties and the other property owners whose title is derived from the
1795 conveyance, the Oneida have not adequately justified their delay."60 To
support his position, Justice Stevens referred to three Supreme Court decisions
which "illustrate the application of the doctrine of laches to actions seeking to
set aside conveyances made in violation of federal law."' According to
Justice Stevens, these three cases "establish beyond doubt that it is quite
consistent with federal policy to apply the doctrine of laches to limit a
vendor's power to avoid a conveyance violating a federal restriction on
alienation."'62 In Justice Stevens' view, applying laches as a defense to Indian
land claims would "maintain the proper measure of flexibility to protect the
legitimate interests of the tribes, while at the same time honoring the historic
wisdom in the value of repose."6'
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation64
Though the Court took a strong leap forward by declaring that Indian tribes
have a cause of action under federal common law for land claims of this
nature, the Court's failure to fully rebut whether the doctrine of laches could
be used as a valid future defense left the question open for future litigation."
Congress refrained from enacting legislation extinguishing Indian land claims
as the Court suggested in Oneida 1.66 Ten years later, the Court's decision in
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation67 sent a shockwave through Indian
tribes throughout the country, with the full ramifications of the decision not yet
fully realized.
In Sherrill, the Court held that the doctrine of laches barred the Oneidas'
assertion of sovereign immunity from property taxation, due to the long lapse
in control over land recently re-acquired from the state of New York through
purchase. 68 The Oneidas' claim stemmed from reservation land sold to a non-
Indian without regard to the provisions of the NIA in 1805.69 The land
60. Id. at 267-68.
61. Id. at 263.
62. Id. at 265.
63. Id. at 262.
64. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
65. Indian Land Claims, supra note 23, at 259.
66. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 253 (1985).
67. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
68. Id. at 202,221.
69. Seeid. at211.
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remained outside of tribal ownership until the Oneida Indian Nation reacquired
eighteen thousand acres on the open market nearly two hundred years later."
Once re-purchased, the Oneidas asserted that the properties retained sovereign
immunity from state and local taxation, as acquisition of fee title revived the
ancient sovereignty.7 Since the parcels of land lay within the boundaries of
the reservation originally occupied by the tribe, the Oneidas refused to pay the
property tax assessed by the City of Sherrill, claiming that the land should hold
the same status as all land which remained in its control from the time of New
York's settlement.72 In contrast to the previous Oneida decisions, the Oneidas
sought equitable relief prohibiting the imposition of all current and future
property taxes on the parcels of land, rather than monetary compensation.73
The district court concluded that the parcels of land owned by the Oneidas
in the two counties were not taxable.74 The Second Circuit affirmed, ruling
that the parcels of land "qualify as 'Indian country' as that term is defined in
18 U.S.C. § 115 1, because they fall within the boundaries of a reservation set
aside by . . . treaty for Indian use under federal supervision., 75 The lower
court also found no legal requirement "that a federally recognized tribe
demonstrate its continuous existence in order to assert a claim to its reservation
land. '76 Upon writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
the court of appeals. 7 The majority rejected the unification theory of the
Oneidas, applied the doctrine of laches to bar relief, and held that "standards
of federal Indian law and federal equity practice preclude the Tribe from
70. Id.
71. Id. at 202.
72. Id. at211.
73. Id. at211-12.
74. Id. at212.
75. Id. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1151 provides, in relevant part:
the term "Indian country"... means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders
of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-
of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).
76. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 212 (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139,
165 (2003)).
77. Id.
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rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold. 7 8 The majority of
the Court expressed that federal Indian law and equity standards preclude the
tribe from reviving ancient sovereignty over the parcels at issue due to 1) the
longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of the area and its inhabitants, 2)
the regulatory authority exercised by New York and its counties over the area
consistently for the past two hundred years, and 3) the Oneidas' long delay in
seeking judicial relief against the State.79 In the words of the Court,
The principle that the passage of time can preclude relief has
deep roots in our law, and this Court has recognized this
prescription in various guises. It is well established that laches, a
doctrine focused on one side's inaction and the other's legitimate
reliance, may bar long-dormant claims for equitable relief.
... There is no dispute that it has been two centuries since the
Oneidas last exercised regulatory control over the properties here
or held them free from local taxation. Parcel-by-parcel revival of
their sovereign status, given the extraordinary passage of time,
would dishonor "the historic wisdom in the value of repose." °
Over-Stepping Boundaries
In several regards, the Court in Sherrill over-stepped legal boundaries
reserved for Congress and supported by judicial precedent, and essentially
established new principles for federal Indian law in a manner that can only be
viewed as judicial activism. In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that
"[w]ithout the benefit of relevant briefing from the parties... the Court has
done what only Congress may do - it has effectively proclaimed a
diminishment of the Tribe's reservation and an abrogation of its elemental
right to tax immunity. ' ' Regarding the Court's care in not overruling Oneida
II, Justice Stevens stated,
It seems perverse to hold that the reliance interest of non-Indian
New Yorkers that are predicated on almost two centuries of
inaction by the Tribe do not foreclose the Tribe's enforcement of
78. Id. at214.
79. Id. at 202.
80. Id. at 217,218-19 (quoting County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida I), 470
U.S. 226, 262 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
81. Id. at 224-25.
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judicially created damages remedies for ancient wrongs, but do
somehow mandate a forfeiture of a tribal immunity that has been
consistently and uniformly protected throughout our history... To
now deny the Tribe its right to tax immunity - at once the most
fundamental of tribal rights and the least disruptive to other
sovereigns - is not only inequitable, but also irreconcilable with
the principle that only Congress may abrogate or extinguish tribal
sovereignty."
Thus, the Court took a broad step towards extinguishing tribal sovereignty
through its decision in Sherrill, imposing a power which is explicitly reserved
to Congress.
The Court's opinion essentially ignored the explicit instructions of
Congress, and established new law in several regards. First, 25 U.S.C. § 177
is quite clear in its directive: an unauthorized purchase of Indian land is
without "validity in law or equity." 3 Effective since 1793, and maintained for
over two centuries, the holding in Sherrill is inconsistent with this statute by
giving effect to purchases on the basis of laches. In fact, Congress has
specifically spoken to the question of whether the Oneidas' rights are simply
too old to now be recognized, and answered in the negative.8' The Court also
overlooked its own precedent to reach its conclusion, and neglected to mention
applicable analysis. In discussing alienation of unallotted land (which warrants
weaker statutory protection), the Court stated, in Ewert v. Bluejacket,5 that
"the equitable doctrine of laches, developed and designed to protect good faith
transactions against those who have slept on their rights, with knowledge and
ample opportunity to assert them, cannot properly have application to give
vitality to a void deed and to bar the rights of Indian wards in lands subject to
statutory restrictions." 6
Sherrill's Legacy: Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki87
The effects of the Sherrill decision on Indian land claims is already proving
to be devastating to their possibility of success. A key example of what lies
ahead regarding the likelihood of tribal land claim success is the decision in
82. Id. at 226.
83. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a), (b) (2000).
85. 259 U.S. 129 (1922).
86. Id. at 138.
87. 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005).
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Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki.88 In Cayuga, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit interpreted the Sherrill decision as precluding the tribe's
"disruptive" possessory land claim based on a violation of the Non-Intercourse
Act, regardless of whether the relief sought was legal or equitable in nature,
and applied the doctrine of laches to bar both ejectment and damages claims.89
The damages, which the court of appeals barred in this case, previously
resulted in an almost $248 million judgment for the tribe in the district court."
Holding that Sherrill had "dramatically" altered the legal landscape of
Indian land claims throughout New York, the court also held that the doctrine
of laches "can apply against the United States in these particular
circumstances."9' Stating that the traditional rule that the United States is not
subject to laches "does not seem to be a per se rule,"92 the court held that
laches could apply here because the delay was "as egregious... as can be
imagined,"93 because the statute of limitations was not enacted "until one
hundred fifty years after the cause of action accrued,"'94 and because the
"United States intervened in this case to vindicate the interest of the Tribe,
with whom it has a trust relationship." 95 Thus, the doctrine of laches can be
applied to the United States when acting in a sovereign capacity, regardless of
whether the suit is filed within an applicable statute of limitations.
The decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Cayuga is not supported
by the decision in Sherrill in several regards. While Sherrill concerned a
particular and unique equitable remedy concerning the assertion of tribal
sovereignty, the district court awarded only damages in the Cayuga case,
which is the type of relief that the Court approved of in the Oneida decisions.96
The Sherrill Court's discussion of laches was limited to equitable remedies,
repeating an observation from Oneida II that "application of a nonstatutory
88. Id.
89. Id. at 275.
90. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 165 F. Supp. 2d 266,366 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), rev 'd, 413
F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005).
91. Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 279.
92. Id. at 278.
93. Id. at 279.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida II), 470 U.S. 226,229-30 (1985);
see also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida (Oneida 1), 414 U.S. 661, 664-65 (1971).
In fact, the Sherrill Court explicitly noted: "the question of damages for the Tribe's ancient
dispossession is not at issue in this case, and we therefore do not disturb our holding in Oneida
II." City of Sherrill v. Oneida Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 (2005).
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time limitation in an action for damages would be 'novel."' 97 Furthermore, the
Sherrill Court repeatedly referred to the district court's decision in Oneida
Indian Nation v. County of Oneida," which denied ejectment as a remedy
while recognizing that the Oneidas could obtain monetary damages.99
Therefore, the Court's holding in Sherrill does not support the majority
opinion in Cayuga that the doctrine of laches can apply to bar an award of
damages against the state, and leave both the tribe and the United States with
no remedy whatsoever.
Subject to the decision of Sherrill, and the expansion of the application of
laches to equitable damages in Cayuga, it can be said with some certainty that
beyond the unlikely chance that a writ of certiorari will be granted by the
Supreme Court, these decisions appear likely to end all Indian land claim cases
and settlement efforts currently pending. Sherrill and its successor cases will
in all likelihood effectively put an end to Indian land claims of this nature
throughout the nation, as the application of laches to bar relief quickly
expands.
The Non-Intercourse Act was enacted to protect Indian tribes against bad
faith acquisition of tribal land, and the Sherrill decision unfairly bars tribes, as
well as the United States, from enforcing the meaning of the Act."° While
Sherrill may have "dramatically altered the legal landscape against which
Indian land claims are considered,"' 0 ' the Cayuga holding reaches far beyond
what can logically be taken from the majority opinion in Sherrill. Sherrill
holds that the doctrine of laches can bar a tribe from obtaining the disruptive
remedy of equitable relief in the form of re-attaining tribal sovereignty or
repossession in land long since changed.'12 The district court's award in
Cayuga of money damages is not an equitable remedy, and nothing in Sherrill
suggests that the ability of Indian tribes to obtain money damages for past
wrongs, where Congress explicitly provided for such damages, should be
barred through laches.
97. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 221 n.14 (citing Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 245 n.16)).
98. 199 F.R.D. 61 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
99. Id. at 93.
100. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).
101. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 273 (2d Cir. 2005).
102. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 217.
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